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RECENT CASES
Administrative Law-Securities Act of 1933-Power of Securities and
Exchange Commission to Compel Registrant to Testify After Withdrawal
of His Application-In accordance with the Securities Act of 1933,1 respondent filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission a registration statement
concerning a proposed issue of securities. Prior to the lapse of the twenty day
period, in which time the statement would have become effective, 2 the commission notified respondent that it appeared to contain untrue statements and to
omit material facts, and that a hearing would be held to determine whether a
stop order should issue to suspend its effectiveness. Later a subpcena was
served on respondent to appear before the commission to testify regarding the
statement. Then, upon the denial of respondent's application to withdraw his
statement," he refused to appear in response to the subpcena. The commission
petitioned the United States district court for an order directing him to comply,
which was granted 4 and, on appeal to the circuit court of appeals,5 affirmed.
Held (Cardozo, Brandeis, and Stone, JJ., dissenting), that respondent having
withdrawn his registration statement, the power of the commission to investigate
by compelling him to testify was thereby terminated. Jones v. Securities &
Exchange Commission, 56 Sup. Ct. 654 (1936).
The majority held that the effect of the commission's notice to the respondent that an inquiry would be held regarding his apparently defective registration statement was to prevent it from becoming effective; thus the situation
was as though nothing had occurred but the filing by the respondent of an
application for permission to use the mails for the issuance of securities. The
proceedings being in such preliminary stage, the respondent had an "unqualified
right" to withdraw his statement; I and having done so, the effect was to end
the proceedings and leave the commission with nothing to investigate. However
logical such reasoning may be, it seems to disregard the provisions of the Act
in several particulars. In the first place, as both lower courts pointed out,7
under the Act a registration statement automatically becomes effective on the
twentieth day after its being filed, unless a stop order has been issued prior
thereto.8 Since no such order had been issued in the instant case, it would
seem that the statement became effective. In such case, the Act unequivocally
empowers the commission, when it appears that a statement is defective, to subpcena witnesses and conduct investigations. 9 In any event, whether or not the
statement became effective, the Act confers plenary authority on the commission to conduct all investigations which it deems "necessary and proper" for its
STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77a (Supp. 1935).
Id. at 79; 15 U. S. C.A. §77h (Supp. 1935).

I•48
2.

3. The denial was based on a commission regulation that "any registration statement
* may be withdrawn upon the request of the registrant if the Commission consents
thereto . . . which consent shall be given by the Commission with due regard to the public
interest and the protection of investors." See 12 F. Supp. 210, 212 (S. D. N. Y. 1935).
4. Jones v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 12 F. Supp. 21o (S. D. N. Y. 1935).
5. Jones v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 79 F. (2d) 617 (C. C. A. 2d, i935).
6. The Court reasoned that since respondent instituted the proceedings by filing his
registration statement he had the same right that a plaintiff at law or equity has to dismiss
his complaint or bill. See Ex parte Skinner &Eddy Corp., 265 U. S. 86, 93 (1924).
7. Jones v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 12 F. Supp. 210, 212 (S. D. N. Y.
1935); 79 F. (2d) 617 61g (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
8.48 STAT. 79; I U. S. C. A. § 77h (Supp. 1935).
9. Id. at 79, 8o; 15 U. S. C. A. § 77h (d) (e) (Supp. 1935).
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enforcement. 10 In the face of such explicit provisions it is difficult to perceive
how the Court found that the registrant, by the simple expedient of withdrawing
his statement, could render the commission powerless. It is equally unclear
why the majority, confronted with such a clear congressional mandate, resorted to doubtful analogies,"1 unless they were motivated by a desire to nullify
the Act and thus to avoid the necessity of passing on its constitutionality. Furthermore, as was pointed out by Justice Cardozo,12 the investigation by the
commission might prove very valuable. As the Act makes the filing of a registration statement which is wilfully false a crime, subject to fine and imprisonment,1" to permit the respondent to withdraw his statement would be to allow
him to impede the gathering of what might be the only evidence available
against him. The proceedings before the commission being much more flexible
than those before a grand jury, the investigation might readily uncover evidence
sufficient to warrant an indictment against the respondent or an associate.1 4
Similarly, there appears to be little merit in the argument of the majority that
just because no one had been injured by respondent's action he was guilty of no
offense requiring investigation. With equal logic it might be argued that one
who has committed a criminal attempt should not be punished, simply because
no one has as yet been injured. Though Congress, by the Act, sought to protect investors by making the attempt to defraud a punishable offense, a registrant
can now bar inquiry into his offense "by precipitate withdrawal on the eve of
his exposure." 15 Despite the fact that the statute expressly makes the submission of a wilfully false statement an offense, the apparent effect of the
decision is to cloak the1 6registrant with immunity, at least until someone has been
injured by his actions.

Aliens-Deportation for Membership in the Communist PartyRelator was an alien legally within the country. On deportation proceedings he
was charged, inter alia,' with membership in an organization believing in the
io.
Ii.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 85; 15 U. S. C. A. §77s (b) (Supp. 1935).
See supra note 6.
Principal case at 664.
48 STAT. 87; i U. S. C. A. § 77x (Supp. 1935).
Justice Cardozo puts the dissent's argument very plainly: "..
. the Act is explicit
. . . that a witness is not excused from testifying on the ground that the testimony . . .
may . . . incriminate him . . . (and he) may not choose to claim his privilege, and

even if he does and is then excused from testifying, other witnesses may be available, for
example, employes, who are not implicated in the offense and who can bring the fact to view.
Moreover, amnesty for one offender may mean conviction for another, an associate in the
crime." Principal case at 664.
15. It would appear that the dissent is quite justified in its criticism that the decision
invites "the cunning and unscrupulous to gamble with detection." The respondent could file
another registration statement in the hope that more cleverly concealed falsities would be
undetected in the short period available before it would become effective. If detected, under the
decision of the Court, he could withdraw and try again. See Douglas and Bates, The Federal
Securities Act of 1933 (1933) 43 YALE L. J. 171, 212; Rodell, Regulation of Securities by the
Federal Trade Commission (Q933) 43 YALE L. J. 272, 275.
16. For a discussion of the constitutionality of the Act, see Isaacs, The Securities Act
and the Constitution (1933) 43 YALE L. J. 218; Legis. (933) 33 Colt. L. REv. 1220; (1936)
84 U. or PA. L. Rtv. 658.
i. There were additional charges that relator personally believed in the overthrow of
the government, by force and violence, and that he caused written matter to be published
advocating it. These, of themselves, are sufficient for deportation. 41 STAT. 1009 (1920),
8 U. S. C. A. § 137 (c), (d) (1927). The evidence supporting these charges, however,
was far from conclusive, as relator restricted his belief in such overthrow, to some indefinite
and future time, and in accord with the principles of Jefferson and Lincoln. Cf. "the
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overthrow, by force and violence, of the government. Immigration officers found
he was a member of the Communist party. Held, that the writ of habeas corpus
should be dismissed because "the courts have generally held" that the Communist
party "believes in overthrowing by force and violence of the government".
United States ex rel. Mueller v. Commissioner of Immigration, N. Y. L. J.,
April 4, 1936, at 1703 (S. D. N. Y.).
Although deportation proceedings are civil in nature, an alien can not be
deported without being given an opportunity to be heard "in such manner as is
consistent with the inherent principles of due process". 2 When such proceedings
are based on the conduct of the alien subsequent to his entry, the burden of proof
is upon the government to establish his guilt." This requirement is not met
merely by taking judicial notice that the organization of which the alien is a member falls within the class proscribed by the statute. Even conceding that the
ordinary rules of evidence are inapplicable in this type of administrative hearing,
the instant court has gone far beyond the scope of judicial notice as delimited
by the cases.4 Also, the decision is inconsistent with holdings of the United
States Supreme Court in analogous situations. For example in all the cases in
which the Court has sustained convictions under criminal syndicalism statutes,
it has gone to considerable length to specify the exact language by which the
accused, or the organization with which he was connected, transgressed the statute." Even more conclusive are the recent cases of Nixon v. Condon 6 and Grovey v. Tozwnsend 7 holding that the basis for determining the rules for membership in and, the principles of a political party is the statements of the party in
convention assembled.8 The contrary view of the lower federal courts 9 apparently dates from the instances of actual advocacy of violence at the close of the
present danger" test laid down by Mr. Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States, 249
U. S. 47, 52 (igig). But such discussion is of little importance, as the findings of 'fact of
immigration officials can not be disturbed unless it is shown that the hearing was unfair,
and an erroneous decision is not a denial of a fair hearing. United States ex rel. Tisi v.
Tod, 264 U. S. 131 (1924); United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U. S. 103 (1927). See Powell, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in
Immigration Proceedings (1909) 22 HAv. L. RFv. 360; Bevis, The Deportation of Aliens
(ig2o) 68 U. oF PA.. L. RE:v. 97, 113.
2. The Japanese Immigrant Case, i8g U. S.86 (igo3) ; Klainer, Deportation of Aliens
(1935) 15 BosToN U. L. REv. 663, 715.
3. Hughes v. Tropello, 296 Fed. 3o6 (C. C. A. 3d, 1924).
4. E. g., Baxter v. McDonnell, 155 N. Y. 83, 49 N. E. 667 (1898) (refused to take
judicial notice of the legal nature and powers of the Catholic Church); Palmer v. Pokorny,
217 Mich. 284, 186 N. W. 505 (1922) (refused to take judicial notice of the termination of
war). "The external political facts of internationalaffairs, as distinguished from the common international law . . ., cannot be said to be the subject of judicial notice." 5 WIGmonE, EvlDmEcn (2d ed. 1923) § 2574; cf. Kjar v. Doak, 6I F. (26) 566 (C. C. A. 7th,
1932), which held that as the Communist party was affiliated with the Third International,
membership in the Communist party constituted affiliation with the Third International,
thus making the alien Communist subject to deportation.
5. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S.652 (1925) (defendant published pamphlet calling
for an immediate "political mass strike"); Burns v. United States, 274 U. S. 328 (1927)
(proof of advocacy of sabotage by member of I. W. W.) ; Whitney v. California, 274 U. S.
357 (1927) (proof of conspiracy to commit acts of violence by Communist Labor party);
cf. Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380 (1927).
6. 286 U. S. 73 (ig32).
7. 295 U. S. 45 (I935), 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1O27.
8. "The fundamental doctrine of democracy prescribes that the only authorized exponent of the views of the people is the People itself, and this means, for a party all its
members assembled by their representatives in a Convention."
2 BRYCz, MODERN
DEmocRncs (192) 40.
9. United States ex rel. Yokinen v. Commissioner of Immigration, 57 F. (2d) 707
(C. C. A. 2d, 1932), cert. denied 287 U. S. 6o7 (1932) (relator had been expelled from the
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World War, 10 for the first case taking judicial notice of the illegal nature of the
Communist party was decided in 192o by this district court.11 Whether any2
of these incidents are attributable to the Communist party is open to question,
but in any event, a program of force and violence does not appear to be advocated by it today.13 A decision by the United States Supreme Court repudiating
the present erroneous holding, and clarifying the confusion which has resulted
from similar decisions, 14 would be desirable.

Banks and Banking-Distribution of Insolvent Bank's Assets-Right
of Partially Secured Depositor to Dividends from Estate of Insolvent Bank
-Appellants, assignees of various trustees who were partially secured depositors
in trust company in hands of Secretary of Banking, excepted to partial account
of the Secretary. The account showed that the amount realized by appellants
from the collateral they held was deducted from the amount owed appellants
at the time the bank was closed, and that dividends were declared only upon
the balance owing them.' Held, no error in affirming dismissal of the exceptions, since the fairest method of distribution was used. In re United Security
Trust Co., 184 Atl. io6 (Pa. 1936).
In the well-known case of Merrill v. National Bank of Jacksonville 2 Chief

Justice Fuller laid down four rules concerning the basis on which a secured
creditor can participate in the distribution of an insolvent's estate. These rules,
now generally accepted as covering the field, have been set out in a discussion
of the principal case before the superior court, in a previous issue of this
REVIEW. 3 It has been pointed out, however, that the so-called "Maryland" and
Communist party a short time before his arrest) ; United States ex rel. Fernandas v. Commissioner of Immigration, 65 F. (2d) 593 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933); Ex parte Jurgans, 17 F.
(2d) 5o7 (D. Minn. 1927). Contra: Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 Fed. 17 (D. Mass. 192o);
Ex parte Fierstein, 41 F. (2d) 53 (C. C. A. 9th, 193o). Cf. United States, ex rel. Kettunen
v. Reimer, 79 F. (2d) 315 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).

io. Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616 (1919) ; see cases cited supra note 5.
ii. United States ex rel. Abern v. Wallis, 268 Fed. 413 (S. D. N. Y. 192o). The court
was "unable to perceive how the expropriation of private property can be accomplished
without the employment of forbidden instrumentalities." Id. at 416. It is interesting to
note that the judge who decided the instant case was the United States district attorney in
the Abern case.
12. "In all our experience of the last fifteen years in handling free speech cases all over
the country, we do not know of a single case of a specific incitement to violence by any
radical. Nor in all the cases of I. W. W.'s, Communists and others which we have handled,
was there any incitement to violence even in general terms." AMERICAN CIVnI LIBERTES
UNION, WHO ADVOCATES VIOLENCE? (1934) 5.
13. STRAc Ey, TiE COMING STRUGGLE FR POWER (Modern Library ed. 1935) xivxvii; Nwmv REPUBLIC, May 6, 1936, at 373. There apparently still lurks in the mind of the

courts an assumption that there is not a great deal of difference between Communists
and Anarchists. See Ex Parte Pettine, 259 Fed. 733 (D. Mass. I1gg). Such a premise
tends to obscure the principle that the alien must believe in more than a radical change in
the form of government. Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 Fed. 17 (D. Mass. 1920). Anarchism
is the negation of all government.
14. From the cases cited, supra note 8, it will be observed that whether an alien whose
sole offense is membership in the Communist party will be released on habeas cortnts may
depend on the particular circuit in which the writ is brought.
I. This statement is taken from the discussion of the principal case before an intermediate court, in (935) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 98.
2. 173 U. S. 131 (1899).
3. (1935) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 98. The rules are broadly as follows: (I)

Bankruptcy

Rule-the secured creditor must deduct the amount of the security he holds from the amount
of his claim and prove for the balance, or else surrender his security to the estate and partici-
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"Illinois" rules are merely variations of the two major ones-the "chancery"
or "equity" rule, and the "bankruptcy" rule.4 Although the former appears
to be supported by the majority of courts,5 the latter has the approval of the
more thoughtful schoohnen, considerable case authority,7 and the magnificent
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice White in the Merrill case." Adoption of the
bankruptcy rule caused the Pennsylvania court some little embarrassment, especially since that court was confronted with a line of decisions which more or
less unquestioningly applied the equity rule to situations involving assignments
for benefit of creditors and insolvent decedents' estates.9 Both appellate courts
based their conclusions on the intrinsic excellence of the bankruptcy rule. The
superior court rationalized the result by remarking that all previous cases involved debtor-creditor relationships and indicating the practical distinction between a deposit and an ordinary loan. 10 On the other hand, the supreme court
preferred to demonstrate that all but one of the previous cases"- had been
decided prior to the passage of the Pennsylvania Insolvency Act of I9oI,: 2
which specifically enacted the bankruptcy rule in cases of assignments for
benefit of creditors.' 3 Clearing the road by an express disapproval of the one
pate in the distribution as an unsecured creditor; (2) Maryland Rule-the secured creditor
may prove and collect dividends on the entire debt, but the total amount of the claim must
be reduced, for the purpose of any one dividend, by any amount realized on the collateral
since the last distribution period; (3) Illinois Rule-the secured creditor may prove and
collect dividends on the entire amount due at the timet of the proving or the sending in of
his claim to the official liquidator; (4) Equity Rule-the secured creditor may prove and
receive dividends on the full amount owed him at the time of the insolvency. Of course all
these rules are subject to the provision that dividends must cease when the claim has been paid
in full. A fifth.rule, termed the Kentucky Rule, has been added in a well-considered article:
Hanson, Secured Creditor's Share of an Insolvent Estate (1936) 34 MICE. L. REV. 309.
This is to the effect that the secured creditor may not share in the general distribution until
unsecured creditors have been paid dividends equal pro rata to the value of the security held
by him.
4. See U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Malia, 49 P. (2d) 954, 956 (Utah 1935) ; First
Wisconsin National Bank of Milwaukee v. Kingston, 213 Wis. 681, 682, 252 N. W. 153, 154
('934).
5. See 3 MIcHiE, BANKS AND BANKING (1931) § 158; GLENN, LIQUrDATION (935)
§ 529.
6. See GLENN, LIQUIDATION f1935) § 530; Clark, Proof by Secured Creditors in Insolvency anzd Receivership Proceedings (i92o) 15 IL. L. REv. 171; Hanson, Secured Creditor's Share of an Insolvent Estate (1936) 34 MicEr. L. REv. 309.
7. Amory v. Francis, i6 Mass. 308 (182o) (leading case) ; Commissioner of Banks in re
Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 241 Mass. 346, 136 N. E. 269 (1922); Bank Commissioners v.
Security Trust Co., 70 N. H. 536, 49 Ad. 113 (igoi); Butler v. Commonwealth Tobacco
Co., 74 N. J. Eq. 423, 70 Atl. 319 (i908) ; In re Withernsea Brick Works, i6 Ch. D. 337
(i88o) ; see exhaustive note, L. R. A. i9i8B io24, and its supplement, (i935) 94 A. L. R.
468, for complete discussion of the four rules and the arguments for and against each.
8. Merrill v. National Bank of Jacksonville, 173 U. S. 131, 147 (1899).
q. Shunk's Appeal, 2 Pa. 304 (846); Morris v. Olwine, 22 Pa. 44i (1854) ; Miller's
Appeal, 35 Pa. 481 (i86o) ; Graeff's Appeal, 79 Pa. 146 (1875) ; Assigned Estate of Graff,
Bennett & Co., 139 Pa. 69, 21 Atl. 233 (1891) ; Jamison's Estate, 163 Pa. 143, 29 Atl. root
(1894) ; Fulton's Estate, 65 Pa. Super. 437 (917).
Io. Such a distinction was drawn in First American Bank & Trust Co. v. Town of Palm
Beach, 96 Fla. 247, 117 So. 900 (1928) ; cf. Law's Estate, i44 Pa. 499, 507, 22 At. 831, 832
(891).
II. Fulton's Estate, 65 Pa. Super. 437 (1917). See cases cited supra note 9.
I2. PA. STAT. AxN. (Purdon, 193o)
t. 39, §§ I et seq.
13. Id., § 90: ". . . any collateral security held by any creditor for his debt shall be
valued by said tribunal, and if the security be retained by the creditor his dividend shall be
on the difference between his claim and the value of his security, so ascertained: Provided,
That the creditor shall have the right to surrender his security, and take a dividend on his
whole debt."
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obstructing precedent, 1 4 the court decided that the Act, although superseded in
some of its provisions by the National Bankruptcy Act, 5 was still in force as
to its severable insolvency aspects, i. e., those dealing with assignments for
benefit of creditors. 16 Then the conclusion was attained by declaring that the
Insolvency Act changed the state's public policy, and that consequently the
bankruptcy rule was to be addressed to the instant situation. Possible future
confusion was averted by an announcement that "the bankruptcy rule should
hereafter be considered of general application." Thus, with heartening progressiveness, the court which had been first in America to supply a standard rationale
for the equity rule 17 has formally recognized; for purposes of administering
modem commercial relations, the superior justice of its competitor.

Constitutional Law-Interstate Commerce-Constitutionality of State
Occupation Tax on Gross Income of Radio Broadcasting Stations-State of
Washington levied an annual one per cent tax on gross income for the privilege
of engaging in business activities, specifically including broadcasting stations.'
Plaintiff, a domestic radio broadcasting corporation, sought to enjoin the defendant tax commission from enforcing the tax against it. Held (reversing
the decision of the Washington Supreme Court), 2 that the injunction should be

granted, as the radio broadcasting corporation was engaging in interstate commerce, and therefore the tax was a direct burden on interstate commerce and
thus in contravention of the commerce clause of the federal Constitution. 3
Fisher's Blend Station v. Tax Commission of Washington, 56 Sup. Ct. 6o8
(1936).
The holding of the Court is completely in accord with the view expressed
in the December issue of the REFVmW, 4 in which the decision of the state court

was criticized.

Constitutional Law-State Regulation of Paperhangers to Protect Public Health as Due Process-A state statute' provided for the licensing of
paperhangers in Baltimore and set up a board of examiners authorized to adopt
rules which would provide for the carrying on of the business in such manner
14- Fulton's Estate, 65 Pa. Super. 437 (1917). Since this case, involving an insolvent
decedent's estate, was in the superior court, the supreme tribunal was faced with a considerably less difficult problem in disregarding it than it would have been if the case had
been decided by the supreme court itself.
15. 30 STAT. 544 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. §§ i et seq. (1927).
16. This decision was consonant with that in Fidelity Trust Co. v. Union National Bank of
Pittsburgh, 313 Pa. 467, 169 Atl. 209 (1933) ; cf. Pobreslo v. Boyd 'Co., 287 U. S. 518, 525
(1933) ; Johnson v. Star, 287 U. S. 527 (1933). The Fidelity case settled a point on which the
state courts had not been unanimous. Cf. Citizens' National Bank v. Goss, 29 Pa. Super. 125
(19o5) ; Peckham's Assigned Estate, 35 Pa. Super. 330 (19o8) ; Walker v. Emerich, 300 Pa.
9, 149 Atl. 881 (193o) ; cf. also, In re McElwain, 296 Fed. 112 (C. C. A. 3d, 1924) ; FidelityPhila. Trust Co. v. Phila.-Girard National Bank, 33 F. (2d) 649 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929).
17. Miller's Appeal, 35 Pa. 481 (I86o).
I.
2.

WASH. REV.

STAT. (Remington, 1934) §§ 8326-1 to 8326-30.
Fisher's Blend Station v. Tax Commission of Washington, 182 Wash. 163, 45 P. (2d)

942 (1935).

3. U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
4. (1935) 84 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 251. For a lower federal court holding to the same
effect as that of the instant case, see KVL, Inc. v. Tax Commission of Washington, 12 F.
Supp. 497 (W. D. 1935), (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 657.
i. Md. Laws 1935, c. 377.
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as to protect the public health. Complainant had been engaged in the business
of paperhanging in Baltimore for many years; and filed this bill to prevent the
enforcement of the act against him, contending that it was an improper exercise
of the police power. Held, that the act violated the Fourteenth Amendment of
the federal Constitution, because it regulated only a "harmless" occupation and
therefore was unnecessary for the protection of the public health, and, in addition, there was no basis for the territorial classification. Dasch v. Jackson, 183
AtI. 534 (Md. 1936).
The court thought that the occupation of paperhanging was one requiring
manual dexterity and skill, rather than a knowledge of sanitary engineering.
Therefore, as the only justifiable basis for the act was its protection of the
public health, and as the knowledge necessary to attain this end was not a usual
incident of the trade, the act was arbitrary. This is in accord with the recognized doctrine that it is beyond the police power to prohibit persons from
engaging in common business occupations that are innocent and lawful in
themselves, and that do not require the exercise of any special skill, 2 for the
legislature may enact only those regulations which are related to the promotion
of health, safety or welfare.3 Likewise, the court could find no valid reason
for restricting the operation of the statute to paperhangers in Baltimore,
although previously it had upheld a similar regulation of plumbers in Baltimore
designed to promote public health, and had held that the application of the act
only to Baltimore plumbers was not discriminatory, because the danger of
disease in a large city warranted the classification. 4 Although plumbing regulations obviously are more essential to the adequate protection of health than is
supervision of paperhangers, regulation of the latter does not seem to be completely unreasonable and unnecessary as an aid to public health, for the respondent's argument indicates that there is doubt, at least, on the matter.5
Therefore, a legislative determination in favor of regulation should not have
been deemed so capricious as to be unconstitutional. However, the present
judicial trend, unfortunately, is to arrogate to some extent certain legislative
functions, including a balancing of interests in deciding whether or not a
statute will aid the public welfare to an extent which will justify a regulation of
the individual.

Contracts-Breach of Promise--Enforceability of Promise to Marry
Made After Decree Nisi but Before Absolute Decree-The defendant, a
married man, promised to marry the plaintiff if and when his wife would divorce
him. After defendant's wife obtained a decree nisi, the defendant again promised to marry the plaintiff. When the absolute decree was obtained against him,
the defendant married a woman other than plaintiff. Plaintiff sued for breach
of the promise made after the decree nisi had been obtained. Held (one jus2. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578 (1897)
(licensing of foreign insurance corporations) ; Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 6o6 (19o3) (prohibition of margin sales of stock) ; Wyeth
v. Cambridge Board of Health, 200 Mass. 474, 86 N. E. 925 (19o9) (licensing of undertakers) ; Luman v. Hitchens Bros. Co., 9o Md. 14, 44 Atl. lO51 (1899) (prohibition on bartering
goods to employees.).
3. Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703 (I885) (regulation of laundries); Powell v.
Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678 (1888) (prohibition of sale of oleomargarine) ; Keller v. State,
122 Md. 677, go Atl. 603 (914)
(licensing of undertakers).
4. Singer v. State, 72 Md. 464, x9 AtI. IO44 (i89o).

5. The respondents defended the act on the ground that the trade required a knowledge
of the elimination and destruction of germs, vermin, and pests; a knowledge of electricity, because the work required the removal of electrical fixtures, and that regulation was needed to
protect the public against irresponsible and inefficient workmen. Instant case at 536.
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tice dissenting), the promise was illegal and unenforceable because the marriage
continued to exist after the decree nisi, and was not dissolved until the decree
absolute. Fender v. Mildnay, 105 L. J. R. 8I (Ct. App. Eng. 1936).1
This decision was based largely on the public policy to uphold and protect
the marriage ties against any molestation and disturbance.2 Promises to
marry upon the future death of an existent spouse,3 or after a divorce has been
obtained 4 have long been held void as tending to alienate the care and devotion
a man owes his wife. But where a decree nisi has already been obtained, although the marriage still exists legally, 5 it is unlikely that a spouse will exercise
the care and devotion hoped for between husband and wife. As the dissenting
justice said, they are then strangers to each other, and the marriage is a mere
shell.6 And although there is some slight chance that the decree absolute will
not be granted,7 either because of new facts against it, or because the spouses
have become reconciled, this is not usual. Nevertheless, even where the divorce
is final, but marriage cannot be entered into by either spouse before a certain statutory period has elapsed, at least one court has held unenforceable a promise to
marry made before such period had elapsed.8 However, it would seem that
although when the legal status of marriage still exists in its entirety, there may
be some reason for a court of law to protect its further existence, when an
action for divorce is already pending or a divorce actually has been received,
the courts should hold men to their promises which have been given for consideration,9 especially since the spouse sought to be benefited is unlikely to be aided
by non-enforcement. 10

Insurance-Power of Beneficiary of Life Insurance Policy to Create a
Spendthrift Trust in the Proceeds with Himself as Cestui-A life insurance
policy stipulated that the insured, or if the insured had not done so, the beneficiary after the insured's death, could, by written notice to the insurance company have the proceeds of the policy paid in equal installments instead of in a
lump sum. The installments were not to be transferable nor subject to the claims
of the creditors of the beneficiary during his lifetime. The insured failed to
exercise this option before his death, and the beneficiary received a check for
the amount of the policy. Three weeks later, the benficiary, without indorsing
or using the check, returned it to the insurance company with a written request
that annuity certificates be issued. The plaintiff, a judgment creditor of the
beneficiary at the time of the insured's death, sought to attach the proceeds of
1. The lower court opinions in this case were commented on in (1935)
(I935) 179 L. T. 443; (1935) i8o L. T. 326.
2. Instant case at go; see Note (19oo) 52 L. R A. 66on.

3.

79 L. J. 360;

Spiers v. Hunt, [igo8] I K. B. 720; Wilson v. Carnley, [io8] i K. B. 729.

4. Leupert v. Shields, 14 Colo. App. 404, 6o Pac. 193 (19o) ; Noice v. Brown, 38 N. J.
L. 228 (1875), aff'd, 39 N. J. L. 133 (1876) ; Williams v. Igel, 62 Misc. 354, 116 N. Y.
Supp. 778 (1909) ; RESTATEMENT, CoNmAcrs (1932)

§ 588.

5. Instant case at 9o.
6. Instant case at 88.
7. Decree absolute has not been granted after decree nisi in a few cases. Flower v.
Flower, [1893] 63 Prob. 28; Parsons v. Parsons, [1907] 76 Prob. 159.
8. Vnuk v. Patterson, 18 Ore. 602, 247 Pac. 766 (1926). But there are many decisions
contra. Buelna v. Ryan, 139 Cal. 630, 73 Pac. 466 (19o3) ; Harpold v. Doyle, 16 Idaho 671,

io2 Pac. 58 (19o8) ; Morgan v. Muench, 181 Iowa 719, 156 N. W. 819 (igi6).
9. Where the plaintiff is ignorant of the defendant's marriage at the time the promise is
made, an action will lie, despite the public policy to hold such promises unenforceable. The
reasoning is that there has been a breach of warranty of capacity to marry. Carter v. Rinker,
174 Fed. 882 (C. C. D. Kan. i909).
Io. See Brown, Breach of Promise Suits (i929) 77 U. oF PA. L. REv. 474, 490.
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the policy which the insurance company retained, joining the beneficiary as defendant. Held, judgment for defendant because the beneficiary was not creating
a spendthrift trust for himself, but was exercising the option to have the proceeds of the policy paid under spendthrift trust provisions, which was valid
under the Act of 1923.-

Provident Trust Co. v. Rothman, 183 Atl. 793 (Pa.

1936).
By its construction of the statute, the court, in reality, has allowed a beneficiary of an insurance policy to set up a spendthrift trust for himself and thus
place his property beyond reach of his creditors when the power had been given
under the contract of insurance. This is interesting in view of the policy of the2
law which opposes the creation of spendthrift trusts for the settlor's benefit.
However, another tendency of the courts which has been fostered with equal
consistency is that of liberal interpretation of insurance statutes in favor of
beneficiaries, even though, as a result, creditors may be affected adversely. 3 In
the present case when the two principles were in conflict, the court adopted a
construction of the statute which goes further than any previous decisions favoring the beneficiaries of insurance policies, and which, if followed, will allow
the beneficiary to choose whether, in the absence of other assets, he will pay his
debts or will enjoy the insurance proceeds free of his creditors' claims. But
the importance of the decision should not be unduly stressed by treating it as
applicable in any way to ordinary spendthrift trusts created for the settlor's
benefit. It must be considered in the light of the Act of 1923, 4 and of a recent
Pennsylvania statute favoring persons making provision for their later needs
and improvidences, which provides that annuity payments to a purchaser of an
annuity, to a certain maximum amount per month, shall be free from claims
of his creditors. 5 The latter statute, in effect, allows a person to establish a
spendthrift trust for himself through the medium of an annuity policy.

Labor Law-Injunction Against Picketing-Application of NorrisLaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act When No Employer-Employee Relation
Exists-Public Policy Expressed in the Act-Defendant labor union picketed plaintiff's meat markets to obtain recognition as the employees' sole agency
for collective bargaining purposes. No employees were members of the union.
i. PA. STAr. ANN. (Purdon, 1927) tit.
40, § 514.

"Whenever under the terms of any

annuity or policy of life insurance, or under any written agreement supplemental thereto,
. . . the proceeds are retained by such company at maturity or otherwise, no person entitled to any part of such proceeds . . . shall be permitted to commute, anticipate, encumber, alienate, or assign the same, or any part thereof, if such permission is expressly
withheld by the terms of such policy or supplemental agreement; and if such policy or
supplemental agreement so provides, no payments of interest or of principal shall be in any
way subject to such person's debts, contracts, or engagements, nor to any judicial process
to levy upon or attach the same for payment thereof . . ."
Concerning the act the court said: "It gives to the insured the right to exempt such
funds from transfer, commutation, or encumbrance, but it does not prohibit the beneficiary
from doing the same thing. Nowhere in the Act of 1923 is there language which limits
such direction to the insured, and it is fair to assume that the beneficiary has the same
power of direction." Instant case at 796.

2. Wenzel v. Powder, ioo Md. 36, 44, 59 Atl. 194, I95 (1904) ; Mackason's Appeal, 42
Pa. 330 (1862); Egbert v. de Solms, 218 Pa. 207, 67 At. 212 (197)); Rienzi v. Goodin,
249 Pa. 546, 95 Atl. 259 (1915). See Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts Created in Whole or in
Part for the Benefit of the Settlor (1930) 44 HARv. L. REv. 203.

3. Kulp v. Marsh, 18I Pa. 627, 37 Atl. 913 (1897) ; Weil v. Marquis, 256 Pa. 6o8, ioi
Atl. 7o (917) ; Irving Bank v. Alexander, 28o Pa. 466, 1-4 Atl. 634 (924) ; Note (935)
84 U. oF PA. L. REv. 236.
4. Cited .rupra note i.
5. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1935) tit. 40, § 515.
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Plaintiff sought to have all picketing enjoined by a federal court, and the union
based its defense on the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act.' Held, that
the injunction should be granted, since in the absence of an employer-employee
relationship between the parties, there was no labor dispute, and secondly, the
"public policy" of the Act required that an employer in no way influence his
employees in their associations or choice of representatives for collective bargaining purposes. Lauf v. E. G. Shinner Co., Inc., 82 F. (2d) 68 (C. C. A.
7th, 1936).
In its statement that the employer-employee relation was essential to constitute a "labor dispute" within the meaning of the Act, the court erred in the
face of the clear purpose 2 and express wording 3 of the statute. It is interesting
to note that, although contrary cases were mentioned and improperly distinguished from this, 4 the court made no reference to Safeway Stores Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Union,' the only case which actually supported its conclusion. The untenability of the result there has been previously pointed out in this REviEW.7
The second, and subsidiary argument advanced by the court to justify the issuance of a sweeping injunction is likewise indefensible. Section 2 of the Act,8
it is true, declares inter alia that it is the public policy of the United States that
workmen "shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives (to
negotiate terms of employment) or in self organization or in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .

.

. ."

From this language the court deduced that picketing which had for

its object the unionization of a shop necessarily involved forcing the employer
to "coerce" his employees to select particular representatives for bargaining purposes, and hence any picketing for such purpose should be enjoined. This
startling conclusion is more than a non sequitur; it is a misapplication of the
Act, whichwas intended to prevent coercion by the employer on his own initiative, and not picketing for a closed shop by a labor union.9 In both grounds for
1. 47 STAT. 70 (1932) ; 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 101-115 (Supp. 1935).
2. The purpose of the act is discussed, and materials collected in Note (1936) 84 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 771.
3. "The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of
employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless
of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee."
(Italics supplied.) 47 STAT. 73 (1932) ; 29 U. S. C. A. § 1I3(c) (Supp. 1935).
4. The court attempted to distinguish between the instant case and Levering & Garrigues
v. Morrin, 71 F. (2d) 284 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 594 (0934),and Cinderella Theater Co. v. Sign Writers Local Union, 6 F. Supp. 164 (E. D. Mich. 1934) on the
ground of factual differences. The court did not, however, and could not, point out any
legally significant differentiating factors, since in both of these cases the courts refused to
enjoin union activity which would have directly affected the representation of non-union
employees. See (1936) IO I. J. A. BuLL., No. io, 9-11. The case of Miller Parlor Furniture
Co. v. Furniture Workers Industrial Union, 8 F. Supp. 209 (D. N. J. 1934) was distinguished
on the ground that there the court did not consider the "Public policy" which was so plain to
the judges of the seventh circuit.
5. 51 P. (2d) 372 (Wash. 1935).
6. The court did rely, however, on its own dicta in the case of United Coal Companies
v. Rice, 8o F. (2d) i (C. C. A. 7th, I935), cert. denied, 56 Sup. Ct. 590 (1936). But in that
case serious violence had played a prominent part in the dispute, and only unlawful conduct
was enjoined. Moreover, the court also .found that the employer had made every reasonable
effort to settle the dispute. Id. at 7. In view of these facts there was at least colorable compliance with the Act in the issuance of the United Coal Companies injunction.
7. See Note (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REV. 771, 772.
8. 47 STAT. 70 (1932) ; 29 U. S. C. A. § 1o2 (Supp. 1935).
9. Section 2 of the Act is expressly limited to matters arising in the interpretationof the
chapter and in determining the jurisdiction of the courts. Since Section 4 (e) expressly prohibits an injunction except where there is fraud or violence, there is clearly no question of
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its decision, therefore, the court seems to have been swayed by its own economic
ideology rather than by the clearly expressed legislative intent. 10 Thus, it seems
doubtful that the instant decision -will be sustained should an appeal be taken.

Legislature-Power of Legislative Investigating Committee Appointed
by Only One Branch of State Legislature to Act After Adjournment
Sine Die of Legislature-The Board of City Trusts of Philadelphia sought
to restrain a committee of the House of Representatives of the General Assembly of Pennsylvania from proceeding, after the adjournment sine die of the
General Assembly, with an investigation of the Board pursuant to a House
resolution passed prior to adjournment. Held, that the injunction should be
granted, because the power of the committee terminated upon the adjournment
sine die of the legislature. Brown v. Brancato, 184 Atl. 89 (Pa. 1936).
Although the decision represents the uncontroverted American view,' courts
have, as in the instant case, expounded, in reaching their decisions, rationes
decidendi that are not entirely clear. Fundamentally, there are two underlying
theories. According to one, the state constitution is said to contemplate legislation only by bicameral concurrence, 2 and therefore, because of the familiar
maxim of interpretation, "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius",3 neither house

acting independently has power to create a committee to act subsequent to adjournment sine die of the legislature.4 A second theory is that the power to
interpretation, calling for the application of the language of Section

2. And it is equally clear
to anyone familiar with the background and purpose of the Act, that Congress was primarily
interested, when it passed the anti-injunction bill, in employer interference with employees
which tended to advance the employer's own interest. Furthermore, if the Act had been intended to outlaw all picketing for a closed shop, as the court apparently supposed, Congress
would have said so unequivocally. This is but a fair inference from the great detail of the
Act in other respects.
IO. There is, of course, nothing novel about the judicial tendency to be influenced in the
decision of labor injunction cases by subjective considerations of social policy which often
may be outmoded. See Note (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 771, 779; GOLDBERG AND LEvENSON, LAWLESS JUDGES (1935) passim, Book Note (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 678.

i. Tipton v. Parker, 71 Ark. 193, 74 S. W. 298 (1903) ; State ecx iel. Robertson Realty
Co. v. Guilbert, 75 Ohio St. i, 78 N. E. 931 (19o6) ; Commonwealth v. Costello, 21 Pa. Dist.
Rep. 232 (Phila. Quart. Sess. Ct. 1912); Ex parte Caldwell, 61 W. Va. 49, 55 S. E. 91o
(19o6) ; see State ex iel. Sigler v. Childers, 9o Okla. I, 14, 215 Pac. 773, 776 (1923). But
cf. People ex rel. Hastings v. Hofstadter, 258 N. Y. 425, i8o N. E. io6 (1932).
2. Thus, in the instant case, the state constitution provides that all legislative power shall
be vested in a bicameral legislature (PA. CONsT., art. II, § i), which shall meet biennially,
but shall hold no adjourned session (Id., art. II, § 4) ; and that neither house shall, without
the consent of the other, adjourn (Id., art. II, § 14).
3. See State ex rel. Robertson Realty Co. v. Guilbert, 75 Ohio St. I, 47, 78 N. E. 931,
935 (1o6).
4. A court which adheres to this theory, and yet holds that one house of the legislature,
acting alone, may authorize a committee to investigate during the session, would seem to be
self-contradictory. See Herwitz and Mulligan, The Legislative Investigating Committee
(1933) 33 CoL. L. Rrv. 4, 17.
But the unquestioned weight of authority is that either
branch of the legislature has power to appoint without the concurrence of the other branch,
an investigating committee to act during the session. See Ex parte Caldwell, 61 W. Va. 49,
51, 55 S. E. 9io, g1 (19o6). Some courts hold that a committee either by statute or by joint
resolution may be empowered to continue after the legislature's adjournment sine die. Branham v. Lange, 6 Ind. 497 (1861) ; in re Davis, 58 Kan. 368, 49 Pac. i6o (1897) ; People v.
Backer, 113 Misc. 400, 185 N. Y. Supp. 459 (N. Y. Gen. Sess. 192o) ; Commercial & Farmers'
Bank v. Worth, 117 N. C. 146, 23 S. E. 16o (1895) ; Terrell v. King, 118 Tex. 237, 14 S. W.
(2d) 786 (1929) ; see People ex i-el Hastings v. Hofstadter, 258 N. Y. 425, 432, i8o N. E.
106, 1O8 (1932) ; Commonwealth v. Costello, 21 Pa. Dist. Rep. 232, 236 (Phila. Quart. Sess.
Ct. I912) ; Ex parte Caldwell, 61 W. Va. 49, 51, 55 S. E. 910, 912 (Igo6). Other courts deny
the power of a committee created by joint resolution to function subsequent to adjournment
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investigate is an implied power auxiliary to the power to legislate,' and since
neither branch of the state legislature has power to enact laws after adjournment sine die, the ancillary power ceases simultaneously 6 with the legislative
power. 7 Under either of these theories, the holding in the instant case appears
sound. nevertheless, it would seem that by reasoning that the expression in the
state constitution requiring the enactment of laws by bicameral action does not
preclude one house from passing a resolution authorizing a vacation committee,
the court could have attained a conclusion equally sound and more desirable. In
the first place, whereas the session of the legislature may be very short, the
scope of the investigation may be so very broad that a committee may not have
sufficient time within a single session to make a thorough investigation. Secondly, if the committee has no power to probe during the recess, there is a long
hiatus during which the persons under investigation have an opportunity either
to conceal or to rectify their aberrations, if any. Finally, if the investigating
committee, proceeding with despatch, should obtain and disclose important facts
and the legislature were then to adjourn sine die, the length of the vacation
period, coupled with other factors, might forestall further investigation during
the next legislative session.

Unfair Competition-Clayton Act-Price Discrimination among Retailers by Manufacturer as Unfair Competition-In a proceeding before the
Federal Trade Commission it was found that the X corporation,_ the largest
manufacturer of automobile tires in the world, supplied substantially all of the
tire requirements of a mail order and chain store company which was the largest retail tire dealer in the United States, under a secret contract by which the
prices charged the mail order company were from 33 per cent. to 42 per cent.
lower over a period of seven years than those charged independent retail dealers
purchasing the same grade of tire from the X corporation.' These price differences were not attributable solely to economies in production and distribution
arising from the large quantity purchases of the mail order house, for after
allowing for such differing costs there remained a discrimination of from i i per
cent. to 23 per cent. unaccounted for.2 The discrimination could not be justified
on the ground that it was made in good faith to meet competition, because the
mail order company had not been solicited by competitors of the X corporation
with offers below the price X corporation had set for its other customers although
the discrimination may have been thought necessary by X corporation to retain

sine die. Dickinson v. Johnson, 117 Ark. 582, 176 S. W. I16

(1915) ; Fergus v. Russel, 270
Ill. 304, iio N. E. 13o (1915) ; In re Hague, lO5 N. J. Eq. 134, 147 Atl. 220 (1929) ; see Gilbreath v. Willet, 148 Tenn. 92, l05, 251 S. W. 910, 914 (1923).
5. See Herwitz and Mulligan, loc. cit. supra note 4, at 15. The dogma is that an investigating committee has power to investigate to obtain information for legislation only, and for
no other purpose. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135 (927) ; It re Hague, 1O5 N. J. Eq.
134, 147 Atl. 220 (i929) ; Commonwealth v. Costello, 21 Pa. Dist. Rep. 232 (Phila. Quart.
Sess. Ct. 1912) ; Terrell v. King, 118 Tex. 237, 14 S. W. (2d) 786 (1929).
6. The courts frequently draw analogies with the rule that the death of the principal
concludes the authority of the agent, or the idea that a limb cannot exist after the death of
the body. See cases cited supra note i.
7. In McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 181 (1927), the Supreme Court of the
United States seems to have approved this theory. In that case, the Court reasoned that the
theory did not apply to a Senate committee since the Senate was a "continuing body", there
being no complete change of its personnel from session to session, but by dictum indicated
that the theory was applicable to a House committee.

i. Principal case, unreported opinion, Findings of Fact, Table I, at 49.
2. Id., Table IV, at 55.
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the mail order company's business.3 Finally, it was found that the discrimination tended to, and did lessen competition substantially, both in the business of
manufacturing tires and in that of selling tires at retail.4 Held, that X corporation should cease its price discrimination in favor of the mail order company because such discrimination improperly lessened competition, and thus violated Section two of the Clayton Act.- In the Matter of Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., Federal Trade Commission, March 5, 1936.
Section two of the Clayton Act forbids price discriminations where their
effect may be to lessen substantially competition in any line of commerce, but
"discriminations . . . on account of . . . quality or quantity" are excepted

from the operation of the act as are discriminations which "make only due allowance for differences in cost of selling or transportation" and discriminations
which are "made in good faith to meet competition". The discrimination in the
instant case tended to lessen competition in the retail tire business by giving the
mail order company a competitive advantage which was contrary to the policy
expressed in the Clayton Act. It was therefore (assuming it not to be within
one of the excepted categories) unfair competition within the meaning of the
act creating the Federal Trade Commission, and a cease and desist order of the
commission was properly available, 6 in addition to the threefold damages provided by Section four of the Clayton Act." To support the order in the instant
case it would not be necessary to find that competition among manufacturers
was lessened by the discrimination against independent retailers dealing with
Goodyear," for the United States Supreme Court has decided that the Act means
what it says-that it prohibits a discrimination, the effect of which may be to lessen competition in any line of commerce 9 -and not merely the discriminator's
line, as a lower federal court had held."0
However, the reasons assigned by the Commission for its decision that the
discrimination was not within one of the excepted categories were less well sup3. Id. at 63, 97. George Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U. S. 245
American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F. (2d)1 763 (C. C. A. 7th, 193o),
cert. denied, 282 U. S. 899 (193I).
4. Within four years, the mail order company increased its annual sales from 700,000
tires to 4,500,000, while during the same period independent retailers were gradually forced
to meet the price cuts made possible by Goodyear's discrimination, and because of the reduced
margin of profit many were forced out of business. Principal case at 66-7o. In 1934 the
National Recovery Administration declared a state of emergency in the tire industry after
bankers, dealers, and manufacturers had brought pressure to bear upon the mail order company not to ruin prices in the industry. Id. at 77.
(1929);

5. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 13 (1927).
6. 38 STAT. 719 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 45 (1927).
7. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 15 (927).

This remedy was given on facts
similar to those of the instant case in American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F. (2d)
763 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930), cert. denied, 282 U. S. 899 (I93I).
8. While the findings of the commission tend to show that independent manufacturers
who produce for independent retailers would be driven out of business if the mail order
company with its advantageous contract with Goodyear continued to undersell the independent
retailers and so drive them out of business, yet it is not unreasonable to look upon such an
effect as somewhat remote. On the other hand, Goodyear has increased its dominant position
in the industry as a result of the discriminatory contract from producing 13% of the total
output in 1926 to 28% in 1929 and 20% in 1933. Principal case at 88, 91.
9. George Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co, 278 U. S. 245 (I929).
io. Mennen Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 288 Fed. 774 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923), cert.
denied, 262 U. S. 759 (1923) ; National Biscuit Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 299 Fed. 733
(C. C. A. 2d, 1924), cert. denied, 266 U. S. 613 (1924). The Mennen Co. case may be upheld
because the discrimination did not tend to lessen competition in "any line of commerce" since
discrimination was between wholesalers and retailers, who are, of course, not competitors.
Similarly, a discrimination between manufacturers of automobiles, who purchase tires for
equipment, and retail tire dealers would not tend to lessen competition "in any line of commerce." S. S. Kresge Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 3 F. (2d) 415 (C. C. A. 6th,
1925); Baran v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 256 Fed. 571 (S. D. N. Y. 1gig).
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ported by precedent. In the only similar case decided by a court it was urged
that the discrimination was justified by the volume of sales made to the favored
purchaser, but the defense was rejected because the reduction in price was not
made available to all of the competing purchasers who might buy the same quantity as the favored one."- The secrecy surrounding the discrimination there was
held sufficient in itself to show that the discrimination was not made on account of quantity; although no competing purchaser was in fact refused the
reduction, none having bought enough to qualify for it. 2 That was precisely the situation in the instant case, but the commission relied only incidentally upon this circumstance." The chief interest of the case lies in the ruling
that a discrimination sought to be justified by differences in quantities purchased
must be reasonably related to, and not substantially more than the savings
effected by selling in such quantities. The result of the instant decision is to
treat the exception on account of differences in quantity as synonymous with
that based on differences in cost of selling, and to qualify them both by requiring the discrimination to be such as makes only due allowance for them both;
whereas, a literal reading of the statute reveals that only the exception relating
to differences in the cost of selling was so qualified.' 4 The importance of such
a construction of the statute lies in the fact that proof of the discrimination's
being not more than a due allowance for the difference in the costs of selling is
extremely difficult, and the burden of proof is on the one making the discrimination."
The construction the commission established was undoubtedly
adopted because sellers might, if there were no such limitation, fix the quantity
for which discounts would be given at so high a figure that only a favored purchaser could avail himself of the advantage, and his competitors would be left
to console themselves with an opportunity to enjoy the same advantage which
was equal only in theory. 6 Under the instant decision, the amount of the discount, on whatever quantity it may be given, is limited to savings actually realized
from such sales. Injury caused competitors of the purchaser by such an advantage is a familiar business risk, that of being undersold by a more efficient distributor, rather than by one who is preferred by the producers.Y

Wills-Construction of Testamentary Intention From Repugnant
Clauses-Testator devised to his widow, by the second clause of his will, all
that which she would have received had he died intestate; and to his "adopted
son", by the third clause, his homestead. 'Unknown to testator the adoption
ii. American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F.
denied, 282 U. S. 899 (193i).
12.

Id. at 767.

(2d)

763 (C. C. A. 7th, 193o), cert.

13. Principal case at 97.
14. The construction adopted in the instant case was apparently thought impossible in
McAllister, Sales Policies and Price Discrimination Under the Clayton Act (1932) 41 YAI.
L. J. 518, 533.
15. American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F. (2d) 763 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930), cert.
denied, 282 U. S. 899 (i131).
16. But cf. National Biscuit Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 299 Fed. 733, 739 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1924).
17. It is interesting to note that the Robinson-Patman bill now pending in Congress
proposes an upper limit to the quantities on account of which a discrimination may be made,
regardless of savings realizable from sales of quantities above the proposed limit. 8o Cong.
Rec., April 20, 1936, at 5981, 5985. An amendment embodying the decision in the principal
case-that discriminations based on savings resulting from large quantity sales were not forbidden by the bill-was accepted by the majority leadership when the bill passed the Senate,
but there is some prospect that this amendment, which was proposed by the minority, will be
eliminated in conference. See N. Y. Times, May 1, 1936, at 8.
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was invalid, in consequence of which the widow, as sole heir at law, was entitled
to the homestead under the intestate laws. The widow petitioned for a decree
ordering the executor to assign the homestead to her. Held, that petitioner was
not entitled to the homestead devised to both her and the "adopted" son, as the
two devises were repugnant, and the determinative rule of construction-construe the will as a whole and, if possible, give effect to every provision of itrequired that the homestead be awarded to the "son!'. In re Bresnehan's Will,
265 N. W. 93 (Wis. 1936).
No ambiguity appeared on the face of the will, for the testator had expressed a clear intention to make two inconsistent and wholly repugnant gifts. 1
Consequently, the problem was the construction of the testator's intention as
expressed in the words of the will, rather than as it subjectively existed in his
mind apart from the testamentary language.2 This situation is governed by
several accepted but conflicting rules of construction, which appear to be impossible of logical reconciliation. The prior devisee in the instant case is favored
by one rule, which prefers the relatives or spouse of the testator to a stranger.3
The subsequent devisee is benefited by another, which requires that the will be
construed, if possible, so as to give effect to all its parts. 4 A third, which is
applicable when the other two conflict, holds that when there are two irreconcilable portions, the latter prevails as the "last" will of the testatorY It is under
the second of the foregoing rules that the present decision was rendered. 6
Manifestly, there can be little reasonable preference of one rule of construction
over another, since one is scarcely more logical than another with respect to the
probable intention of the testator when that intent must be derived solely from
the written instrument, and all are merely rules of convenience. In point of
fact, no logical preference ever is demonstrated by the courts and then made
the reason for the decision, for it is evident that they merely have drawn prior
conclusions on the undisclosed equities of the particular case, after which the
decisions are supported under the most feasible rule. It would seem that the
instant court resorted to this method of decision, although unnecessarily so; for
the rule favoring the last devisee in point of position is applicable to resolve the
dilemma when the other rules of construction are unable to indicate the intent
of the testator,7 as in the instant case. The dissent was based on the ground
that the effect of permitting the subsequent devisee to recover was to reform
rather than to construe the will, since the prior devisee would take under a
devise which, in effect, included added words subjecting her to the claims of the
i. Instant case at lOO.
2. Norton v. Jordan, 36o Ill. 419, 427, 196 N. E. 475, 479 (1935) : "To arrive at his
[testator's] intention as expressed by the language of the will, and not an intention which
existed in his mind apart from such language, is the purpose of testamentary construction."
To the same effect, see Leland v. Hoke, 156 Misc. 494, 281 N. Y. S. 919 (Sup. Ct. 1935);
GARDNER, WILLS (1903) 383; I JARMAN, WI.LS (7th ed. 1930) 492.
3. Widdowson v. Widdowson, 278 II App. 522 (1935) ; In re Pettit's Will, 241 App.
Div. 209, 271 N. Y. S. 757 (3d Dep't 1934) ; Ip re Connor's Estate, 318 Pa. 15o, 178 AtI. 15
(1935) ; GARDNER, WILLs (1903)

374.

4. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Lucas, 66 F. (2d) 116 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933);
Wheeler v. Moulton, 195 N. E. 777 (Mass. 1935) ; It re Duffy's Estate, 313 Pa. ioI, 169 AtI.
142 (933); see THoMPsox, WILS (1916) 134; I JARMAN, WILLS (7th ed. 1930) 546.
5. Thomas' Ex'r v. Marksbury, 249 Ky. 629, 61 S. W. (2d) 282 (1933) ; ip re Windt's
Estate, ixo Pa. Super. 124, 167 Atl. 467 (1933); THompsoN, WILLS (igi6) 133; UNDERHILL
AND STRAHAN, WILLS AND SErrnLtmrs (3d ed. 1927) 36. Contra: Phillips v. Phillips, 217
Iowa 374, 251 N. W. 511 0933).
6. Instant case at 98.
7. UNDERHILL AND STRAHAN, op. cit. mtpra note 5, at 37.
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subsequent devisee-" But this result does not necessarily follow, for the prior
devise is nevertheless valid as to any balance after the subsequent devisee has
been satisfied, without such further dispositive words.9
8. Instant case at ioo. The dissenting chief justice stated that the effect of the majority
opinion was to add to the prior devise, which read, "I give . . . to my wife . . . all
*
. . to which she is entitled under . . . the laws of the State of Wisconsin, the same as

though no will had been by me made", the words, "and I had a legal heir surviving."
9. ". . . it is a settled and invariable rule not to disturb the prior devise farther than
is absolutely necessary for the purpose of giving effect to the posterior qualifying disposition."
I JAIRMAN, WnLS (7th ed. 1930) 544. To hold otherwise would be contrary to the rule that
a will is to be construed, and its clauses are to be reconciled, so as to give operative effect to
the whole. See supra note 4.

